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Abstract—Vehicular networks have a diverse range of ap-
plications that vary from safety, to traffic management and
comfort. Vehicular communications (VC) can assist in the eco-
routing of vehicles in order to reduce the overall mileage and
CO2 emissions by the exchange of data among vehicle-entities.
However, the trustworthiness of these data is crucial as false
information can heavily affect the performance of applications.
Hence, the devising of mechanisms that reassure the integrity of
the exchanged data is of utmost importance. In this article we
investigate how tweaked information originating from malicious
nodes can affect the performance of a real time eco routing
mechanism that uses DSRC communications, namely ErouVe.
We also develop and evaluate defense mechanisms that exploit
vehicular communications in order to filter out tweaked data. We
prove that our proposed mechanisms can restore the performance
of the ErouVe to near its optimal operation and can be used as
a basis for protecting other similar traffic management systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) incorporate a
communications environment over the wireless medium be-
tween mobile nodes, e.g. vehicles, infrastructure nodes, e.g.
road side units (RSUs), with the aim being to increase road
safety [1], [2] traffic efficiency [3] and reduction of CO2
emissions [4] [5], hence establishing a safer and greener
environment for transportation [6] [7]. That is, vehicles and
RSUs broadcast messages regarding road conditions, accidents,
traffic reports, etc. and hence, become part of the Vehicular
Ad Hoc Network (VANET). Of particular importance are
environmental-friendly mechanisms, including the reduction of
CO2 emissions and mileage 1 [8], since vehicles not powered
by fossil fuels are not soon to disappear, e.g. by fully electrical
vehicles.
The evolution of vehicles to mobile connected entities
with On-Board-Units (OBUs) and Internet access [9] exposes
otherwise legitimate vehicles to potential threats, i.e. infected
with malware. Reports 2 3 indicate that the infection of vehicles
is now, indeed, a realistic scenario and the involvement of
such in VANET protocols can result in catastrophic events.
Examples range from injecting false data to disrupt the vehic-
ular environment, e.g. with false data related to traffic conges-
tion, traffic accidents and road conditions [10], to inhibiting
1http://www.symantec.com/security response/publications/threatreport.jsp
2http://www.detroitnews.com/story/business/autos/2015/02/08/
report-cars-vulnerable-wireless-hacking/23094215/
3http://www.techhive.com/article/221873/With Hacking Music Can
Take Control of Your Car.html
communication, e.g by jamming [11], or to more extreme
phenomena such as endangering human lives by taking control
of a vehicle [12].
In [4] we proposed an eco-routing protocol, namely
ErouVe, which utilizes vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I),
infrastructure-to-infrastructure (I2I) and infrastructure-to-
vehicle (I2V) communications to provide routing instructions
to vehicles for a greener trip towards their destination, i.e.
optimizing travel duration and CO2 emissions. However, the
original ErouVe algorithm gives no protection against bogus
information originating from infected/infiltrated vehicles
and identifying potential vulnerabilities in a connected
car’s communication systems is a key factor for shielding
it against rational attacks. As online attacks have become
potentially more hazardous and aggressive in recent years,
the development of real time defense mechanisms has been
stepped up.
To this end, in the current work we focus on providing
an effective defense system against potential spurious data
“running” through the system’s communication phases, which
are aimed at disrupting ErouVe’s routing decisions. Our ex-
perimentation shows that the proposed defense successfully
identified outliers and hence, restored ErouVe to near original
instructions, i.e. no bogus data was present. An important
information element in VANET communications is the posi-
tion of adjacent nodes since most applications rely on them.
Functions, such as the geographic routing on the network layer
or the V2X applications, require genuine, accurate and reliable
location data regarding neighbors. As a result, we propose to
verify the consistency and plausibility of location-related data
of adjacent nodes that are broadcasted frequently as CAMs or
geo-networking beacons.
II. RELATED WORK
Inter Vehicle Communications (IVC) support applications
that are related to safety [13], traffic management [14] and in-
fotainment, with most of these applications requiring frequent
data exchange among vehicles. In addition to reassuring that
packets are delivered on time, which is crucial for safety appli-
cations, mechanisms that ensure accuracy and consistency of
the data are required. In order to provide a secure environment
for vehicular communications we need to consider information
security requirements, such as confidentiality, integrity and
authentication. Also, QoS is important as applications that
deal with the safety of the drivers e.g. intersection collision
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avoidance or emergency braking, require real time communi-
cations and have strong delay constraints. There are numerous
kinds of attack that may threaten confidentiality, availability
and authenticity of data [15].
Many routing protocols try to establish paths among enti-
ties that guarantee fast and reliable communication. During
the creation of these routes vehicles exchange information
about their position, velocity, direction etc. and a mechanism
is used to select those nodes that are optimal for each pro-
tocol. In a black hole attack, a malicious node exploits this
mechanism, advertising itself as providing the shortest path
and attracting most of the traffic its way [16]. The attacker
can choose to drop the packets or manipulate the data, by
sending them to the wrong recipient, for example. As a
result, the source and the destination nodes become unable
to communicate with each other. Denial of Service (DOS) and
Distributed DOS attacks can affect the availability of the data,
since the attacker can jam the medium, thereby disrupting
the communication among the nodes. The authors in [11]
showed that RF jamming poses a serious threat to safety in
VANETs, for according to their experimental study, jammers
can severely disrupt communication up to 465m despite very
short communication distances between legitimate devices.
During a Sybil attack [17], a malicious vehicle may pretend
to be multiple vehicles and then use these multiple IDs to
distribute false information. The deleterious effects of such
attacks can cascade through the network and cause problems
in proper dissemination of the information. Timing and node
impersonation are two other examples of attacks affecting the
correct delivery of the information that can be easily launched
in a vehicular environment.
A first step towards devising an appropriate defense system
is the ability to detect infiltrated vehicles. As noted in [18],
misbehavior detection in VANETs can be divided into Node-
centric or Data-centric mechanisms, with the first inspecting
the behavior of a vehicle node, but not the data it sends. For
example, if the rate at which a node sends packets exceeds
a normal (predefined-historical) one, it is characterized as
a misbehaving vehicle [15]. Other mechanisms in the same
category include some form of reputation management, which
inspects the past and present behavior of a node to derive the
probability of future misbehaviour, as implemented in [19].
Filtering out false data is another technique widely used
in WSNs and VANETs [20]. Our proposed scheme is based
on a form of reputation and filtering, since vehicles constantly
exchange their current information, which they use in order to
create and maintain a list of their neighbors. In our defense
mechanism, all the data collected from the vehicles are gath-
ered and validated by the RSUs 4. This way, information that
is sent from infected vehicles is discarded and hence, their
credibility is considered to be zero.
The second discrimination concentrates on the dissemi-
nated data in order to detect misbehaving vehicles, a scheme
which is also used in our proposed defense system. Specif-
ically, the disseminated data are evaluated for plausibility
and/or consistency. For example in our evaluation scenario,
plausibility will ensue if a vehicle reports a travel time of a few
4http://www.bmvi.de/SharedDocs/EN/Anlagen/VerkehrUndMobilitaet/
Strasse/cooperative-its-corridor.pdf? blob=publicationFile
seconds while traveling a relatively long path. Consistency will
be applied if a vehicle sends high (or low) statistics for a road
segment, e.g. CO2 emissions depending on the attack’s goal,
which although plausible, significantly deviate from similar
reports of vehicles from their one hop neighborhood.
III. PRELIMINARY WORK, ErouV e
The original ErouV e algorithm, as presented in [4], iden-
tified congestion phenomena by taking into consideration the
travel duration and CO2 emitted by vehicles in specific road
segments. In the next subsection we describe the algorithm
specifications and functionality along with the new mechanism
for routing instructions.
A. System Description
We consider a network system G = (V,L), where V
depicts the set of nodes (intersections - RSU placements)
and L are the road segments connecting those intersections.
The set of road segments adjacent to an RSU n ∈ V , is
denoted as S(n). RSUs with common adjacent road seg-
ments are considered as neighbors, e.g. of n, and denoted as
N(n). Note that two neighboring RSUs may be connected
through more than one route. Vehicles send data regarding
their traversed road segment l ∈ L, i.e travel duration and
CO2 emissions, to the corresponding RSU (Figure 1). Next,
neighboring RSUs exchange beacon messages with the data
acquired from vehicles and with these specifications, each
RSU n calculates average values for each segment l ∈ S(n).
In order to have updated information for a road segment,
the RSUs only consider records within the most recent time
window of s seconds (TIN), from which an optimal-eco route
for each vehicle can be identified. Note that ErouVe runs on
level 2 of automation to advise upcoming vehicles; ”Combined
function automation”.
Fig. 1. Decentralized CO2 reduction system based on DSRC communications
B. System Initialization
The initial step of the system is to compute for all n ∈ V
their corresponding neighbors, i.e. N(n) and for all m ∈
N(n), Dijkstra’s algorithm is used to acquire the distances
between two RSUs, Dnm, based on GPS data. Consequently,
each RSU n becomes aware of it’s vicinity and the road
segments through which it is connected to any other RSU
m ∈ N(n). Note that no time or CO2 cost is initially calculated
for the road segments. Table I briefly describes the initial
information stored by each RSU. As illustrated, column 2 holds
the neighbors of each RSU, column 3 has the road segment(s)
through which neighboring RSUs are connected and finally,
column 4 illustrates the distances of each road segment. For
example, a vehicle k from R1 can reach R2 through segments
la and lb in distances Da and Db, respectively.
TABLE I. EXAMPLE OF CONNECTIONS TABLE FOR 3 RSUS
RSU Id Neighbors Road Segments Distance
R1 R2, R3
R2: la, lb
R3: lc
R2: la(Da), lb(Db)
R3: lc(Dc)
R2 R1, R4
R1: la
R4: ld
R1: la(Da)
R4: ld(Dd)
R3 R1, R5
R1: lb
R5: le
R1: lb(Db)
R5: le(De)
C. Communication Phases
This section briefly explains the different communication
phases of the original algorithm.
1) Road Segment Measurements (I2V): For any vehicle
k, which just completed its course on road segment l the
corresponding RSU impels vehicle k to:
• calculate total time traveled (TTlk), and CO2 emis-
sions (Clk) on road segment l.
• send to the RSU the calculated values of TTlk and
Clk
2) Communication of RSUs (I2I): Each RSU will send
the accumulated values for mean travel time and CO2 emis-
sions of each vehicle to the corresponding neighboring RSUs
through beacon messages.
3) Route Request-Reply (V2I)-(I2V): Each vehicle k that
enters the control range (intersection area) of an RSU sends
a route request message (Rq) to the corresponding RSU,
which in turn, after solving the optimization problem (cf. next
subsection) based on data obtained through I2I, sends routing
instructions to the corresponding vehicle via an Ra message
(route answer).
D. New Decision System for Optimal Routes
In the initial ErouVe mechanism, as presented in [4],
weights were assigned to each segment adjacent to the current
road and then the road with the minimum was chosen. By
following a slightly different approach we developed a multiple
decision mechanism. The new mechanism, rather than adding
the different values of the three features used, e.g. Time, CO2
and distance, it logically combines the outcomes of the three
decision rules, each representing one of them (Figure 2).
In the new ErouVe mechanism, the RSU, after receiving
a route request message from an approaching vehicle k,
compares the outgoing road segments based on the current
mean time, mean CO2 and the added distance that each
routing decision brings about. The outcomes of each decision
are combined using weighted majority voting and different
Fig. 2. New decision mechanism
weights can be used in order to focus on one of the different
optimization parts, e.g. time, distance or CO2 emissions. In
the default system settings, all optimization parts have the
same significance. For example when comparing two potential
routes, e.g. k and l, if D1 and D2 for k are greater than D1 and
D2 respectively of l, l is selected as the next road segment.
IV. EROUVE VULNERABILITIES
As previously noted, the original ErouVe algorithms utilize
V2I, I2I and I2V communications, in order to ascertain which
is the most eco-friendly route for any vehicle to follow.
However, the technique’s performance so far, assumes that
vehicles will send only real data to the corresponding RSU. If
we devise a scenario where tweaked information exists among
the received data, the algorithm’s formula can mislead vehicles
to not only false eco-friendly routes, but also, create traffic
congestion and hence, significantly deteriorate the system’s
performance, i.e. increase travel time and CO2 emissions.
In this study, we classify tweaked information into two
basic categories depending on how an infiltrated vehicle ma-
nipulates data:
• Send tweaked data to favor a route (FAV)
• Send tweaked data to fend from a route (FEN)
FAV can be seen as an attack that creates a false image for a
specific road segment, by sending relatively small statistics, i.e.
short travel time or CO2, thus making a target route favorable.
In such a case, vehicles could be instructed to follow the
attacked route, however, if the road throughput cannot satisfy
the increasing number of vehicles, this can result to traffic con-
gestion and bottlenecks. FEV also tweaks the real conditions
regarding the road segment under consideration, but follows a
reverse policy from FAV, e.g. sending a relatively large travel
time to the corresponding RSU. With such misinformation,
vehicles will be directed to a different path which can also
result in the aforementioned problematic scenarios.
However, modified data regarding the accumulated CO2
emissions or travel time is not the only vulnerability of the
original ErouVe algorithm. Recall that once a vehicle exits
the road segment under consideration, it sends a report to
the corresponding RSU about the “condition” of the road
segment it has traversed. However, so far RSUs have had no
knowledge of which route the corresponding vehicle actually
followed, apart to what was stated by the sending vehicle
itself, and thus, cannot distinguish to which route the received
data belongs. Consequently, an infiltrated vehicle can denote
that these values correspond to a different route (regardless of
whether these values are altered or not) and hence, meddle with
the system’s next decisions. With the above considerations, the
original algorithm stands unprotected (vulnerable) to such false
information and thus, our primary objective lies in devising a
defense system to counter data originating from such malicious
vehicles.
V. ATTACK PLANS
A. Attack Objectives
To built on our defense system, we discuss several at-
tack plans and their impact on ErouVe. The original ErouVe
algorithm was implemented in order to balance the traffic
flow between all possible available routes with a common
destination and hence, solve potential road congestion. The
proposed technique was compared to a scenario where the
shortest route, followed by all vehicles, was unable to satisfy
the traffic flow, thereby creating congestion in the path. By
experimenting in high density traffic conditions, we found
that ErouVe’s routing instructions successfully managed the
traffic flow between the corresponding available paths and
as a consequence, significantly enhanced the system’s perfor-
mance, i.e. up to 30% improvement in travel duration. As
a result, our attack plan focuses on sending “appropriated”
(tweaked) data to recreate a scenario where all vehicles follow
the shortest path and create congestion, although under the
ErouVe paradigm. Intuitively, a combination of attacks, i.e.
vehicles sending favorable statistics regarding the shortest road
segment, i.e. FAV, and complementary unfavorable ones for
the other route(s), i.e. FEV, will affect the systems routing
decisions. By reversing the attack plan on the road segments,
i.e. FAV for the longer routes and FEV for the shortest path, we
obtain a different impact on the protocol’s routing decisions.
In this case scenario, vehicles will unnecessarily be rerouted to
longer routes, resulting in increased travel duration and CO2
emissions for each individual vehicle and concurrently, the
system.
The aforementioned attack plans have contradictory objec-
tives. In the current study, we focus on the recreation of con-
gestion for the shortest route by exploiting the vulnerabilities
of the original protocol, i.e. Fake Route (FR) and Fake Data
(FD).
B. How To Attack
First, recall that ErouVe uses data collected from vehicle
measurements, accumulated within the most recent time win-
dow of s seconds, i.e. in TIN and hence, bogus information
has a maximum lifetime of TIN in ErouVe. Moreover, our
experimentation showed that data from a single infiltrated
vehicle can have zero effect in the original ErouVe protocol,
i.e. does not sufficiently change the weight values assigned to
road segments and thus their overall ranking, depending on the
extent to which the data are tweaked from their original values.
However, if an attacker tries to use significantly deviated values
to affect the formula/protocol, the received data from other
(healthy) vehicles in a relatively short time, would render the
identification of such bogus vehicles an easy task.
Since a single bogus vehicle may not make a difference to
the protocol’s routing decisions, grouped attacks are necessary,
i.e. a number of infiltrated cars that report their stats to an
RSU for a target road segment in a relatively short time.
However, bogus information has a lifetime TIN in ErouVe
and thus, short time reports must be defined with respect
to TIN. As a final observation, on the occasion where a
successful attack occurs, the system can still recover quickly
if the weighted order of road segments is not changed much
and a sufficient number of healthy (non tweaked) vehicle
reports follow. Consequently, catastrophic results, i.e. creating
traffic congestion or unnecessarily rerouting a large of number
vehicles to longer routes, can still be avoided, even with no
sophisticated protection against false information.
To summarize, vehicles must not only meddle with the
data to a degree that will not be undone with a few upcoming
healthy vehicles, but also, to such an extent that it will
not make the RSU suspicious, i.e. it cannot send extremely
deviated values from the actual measurements. Finally, timed
attacks are essential with respect to TIN as a single vehicle
might not make a difference in the overall ranking of the road
segments.
VI. PROPOSED DEFENSE SYSTEM: ENHANCED EROUVE
The goal of our defense system is to filter out tweaked data,
so as to return the functionality of ErouVe to near identical
routing decisions, i.e. to an attack free scenario. Hence, data
received by an RSU will be “judged” for both plausibility and
consistency [18].
A. Fake Route Countermeasures
In order to counter the fake route problem we utilize the
yet unused communication phase, i.e. Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V)
communication in our model. To this end, vehicles traveling
for instance on a specific road segment l, broadcast beacon
messages regarding the vehicle’s ID and that of their current
road segment, e.g. l. Upon exiting the road segment under
consideration, a vehicle k now sends information regarding,
not only TTlk and Clk, but also, the vehicle IDs that co-
traveled with vehicle k on road segment l.
By instructing vehicles to gather information about their
vicinity in their current road segment, bogus vehicles cannot
state a different route than the actual one they followed. This
is due to the fact that the current mechanism allows an RSU
to have an accurate image for which vehicle followed which
route based on the majority of votes. To bypass the system’s
new defense, a large number of infiltrated vehicles need to
be grouped appropriately, i.e. of magnitude greater than the
currently healthy vehicles in the corresponding road segment.
Nonetheless, in such a scenario, where the majority of vehicles
are infected vehicles, all defense mechanisms are bound to fail.
In our experimentation, we assume that beacons exchanged
between vehicles cannot be “heard” in different road segments.
This can be justified if we consider that the distance between
the road segments could be greater than the standard DSRC
communication range or because of the existence of obstacles,
e.g. buildings in an urban scenario that interfere with the
communication.
B. Fake Data Countermeasures
After properly matching data to the corresponding routes,
we have to deal with vehicles that tweak their accumulated
statistics of travel duration and CO2 emissions. First, we
assume that statistics from healthy vehicles in short time, e.g.
of a few seconds, cannot deviate significantly. It is a reasonable
assumption if we consider that nearby vehicles will experience
similar traffic conditions, e.g. similar traffic density. Now, we
need to clarify the validity of each newly received vehicle
report. To this end, we define a new time window of about a
third of TIN, namely, Validation Window (VoW), which will
hold the reports of vehicles in a very recent image of the road
segment under consideration. The Euclidean Distance between
the report under “judgment” and those in VoW will decide the
validity of the new data:
D(x) =
√√√√ N∑
i=1
(x− yi)2 (1)
where, x stands for CO2 emissions (or travel duration) of
the new vehicle and yi for the corresponding N values in
VoW. Dx is compared to a threshold (THd) that determines
to which set it will be included based on the rule: If Dx < Thd
then x ∈ VoW else x ∈ PBS. Parameter THd determines the
sensitivity of the defense mechanism when categorizing new
data as normal or bogus, cf. subsection VII-D.
However, a distant report is not necessarily a bogus one,
i.e. it may correspond to a true change in the traffic conditions
of a road segment from dense to light traffic (congested to
uncongested) and vice versa. Consequently, once a distant
vehicle is identified, we do not take prompt action to drop its
data, but rather save them in a separate set, namely, Potentially
Bogus Set (PBS) in order to account for the abovementioned
case. We expect that if the report corresponds to a realistic
traffic change, a number of similar ones are to follow. If the
upcoming values are consistent with those in VoW, then the
values in PBS are dropped and labeled as truly bogus data.
Alternatively, if the size of PBS grows beyond that of VoW,
we acknowledge a traffic shift and thus, integrate values of
PBS to VoW. Figure 3 illustrates the proposed mechanism.
Data are consistent (VoW) when below the distance threshold
and otherwise inconsistent (PBS).
Finally, we should note that, as explained in Section III, a
vehicle sends an Rq message in order to receive instructions.
This places the following constraint: vehicles cannot easily lie
about their travel duration. This is due to the fact that the
RSU is aware of the time interval between the reception of
an Rq message, and the time it receives the statistics from the
corresponding vehicle. Nonetheless, more sophisticated plans
can be deployed to tweak travel duration, but are beyond of
the purposes of the current study. Henceforth and without loss
of generality we assume that only CO2 emissions are tweaked.
Fig. 3. Fake Data Countermeasures
VII. EXPERIMENTATION SETTINGS
A. Simulator
For the evaluation of our model, we use the simulator
VEINS [21], which is composed of two well known simulators:
OMNET++ an event-based network simulator and SUMO, a
road traffic simulator. To calculate CO2 emissions for each
individual vehicle we apply the EMIT model integrated in
VEINS. It is a statistical model for instantaneous emissions
and fuel consumption based on the speed and acceleration of
light-duty vehicles.
B. Evaluation Scenario
Similarly to our previous work [4], we built a map about
2km long (Figure 4) with a single direction and two available
paths. The upper and longer path is about 275m long, whereas
the lower and shorter path is about 190m. Both road segments
have the same capacity in lanes, i.e. 2 lanes. These paths merge
at junction 2, where the upper part can occupy 2 lanes of the
next 3 lane road segment, whereas the lower part can occupy
only 1. This setting is used to demonstrate a typical urban
scenario, where part of a road can be temporarily closed due
to maintenance or a car accident. Another potential scenario
includes crossroads with different priorities, where vehicles in
the road segment with less priority line up and give room to
traffic flows on roads with higher priority. Such considerations
coupled with medium traffic can make a road segment that
seems attractive, i.e. shorter path towards destination, unable
to satisfy the traffic demand and consequently, result in major
traffic congestion.
C. Communication Settings
• Communication Range: this is the communication
range that can be achieved from vehicles or RSUs
according to the setup of the system, which in our
experimentation is set to 300m.
• Handshake Range: this is the range after which
an approaching vehicle is aware of the presence of
an RSU at an upcoming intersection through beacon
messages emitted by the RSU. At this point, vehicles
store the position of the corresponding RSU and this
range is set to 100m.
• Control Range: the final communication range of our
system depicts the distance at which vehicles receive
routing instructions (Ra message) from an RSU. In
our simulation we set this range to a medium value, in
order, if necessary, to give time to vehicles to perform
rerouting, i.e. 50m.
D. Parameters
In Sections IV and V, we explained the vulnerabilities of
the original ErouVe algorithm and devised attacks to address
those points. Table II summarizes the attack plans and their
configuration, vehicle velocity, number of vehicles, and TIN
values, as used in our experimentation. Group size is the
number of consecutive vehicles that report false data, i.e.
one to five vehicles, and attack interval is the time between
such groups, e.g. every six seconds. The attack intervals are
chosen with respect to TIN, i.e. at least two attacks groups
must occur within one TIN. opt indicates how bogus vehicles
tweak their original values in order to deceive the system.
It is calculated for each road segment with respect to the
road length and vehicle velocity, i.e assuming vehicles travel
in an uncongested road segment with the maximum allowed
speed. For the FR attack, vehicles do not tweak their data, but
rather, state that the accumulated statistics correspond only to
the long route. For FD, bogus vehicles traversing the short
route will say that they have experienced uncongested road
conditions, i.e. opt, whereas for the long route vehicles will
state that there is significant congestion. Both attack protocols
favor the short route in hopes of creating congestion. Extensive
experimentation was conducted in relation to the simulation
parameters and in the next section, we present the most
characteristic results. Unless stated otherwise, default values
are used.
VIII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. ErouVe Vs Shortest Path VS FR attacks
In Figure 5, the CO2 emissions (ml) and travel time (sec)
of each vehicle are demonstrated. ErouVe in an unprotected
mode performs similar to the original shortest path, since due
Fig. 4. Simulation Map
TABLE II. SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameters Range Default
Attack Type FR, FD FD
Group Size 1-5 3
Attack Interval (s) 6,10,14 10
FR Short Route opt-2*opt original
FR Long Route opt-2*opt original
FD Short Route opt-2*opt opt
FD Short Route opt-2*opt 2*opt
Infected Vehicles (%) 10 - 30 20
THd (%) 10 - 50 10
Vehicle Speed (Km/h) 40 - 90 40
Number of Vehicles 50 - 150 150
TIN (s) 30 - 120 30
to the fake route attack it sends most of the vehicles to follow
the lower road segment (shortest path). This increased traffic
leads to road congestion that has an immediate effect on both
time and CO2 emissions. That is, the mean increases in time
and CO2 compared to that in the attack free scenario are
31% and 20%, respectively. Such an increase can be further
explained considering that ErouVe sends 25% of the vehicles to
follow the longer route, whereas in the FR scenario only about
8% of the vehicles take the longer path. Such observations
justify the need for countermeasures and the proposed defense
mechanism, as described on Section VI, makes the ErouVe
mechanism robust to such attacks.
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Fig. 5. FR successfully deceives the original algorithm into sending vehicles
to the short route and thus creating congestion. Travel duration and CO2
emissions are significantly increased by 31% and 20% respectively.
B. Impact of Attack Group Size
Figure 6 illustrates how the number of consecutive vehicle
attacks (attack group size) affects the system’s average per-
formance, with the attack interval set at 10 seconds. The Y-
axis represents the deviation from an attack free scenario, i.e.
performance drop. For one vehicle per 10 seconds we observe
a minor deviation, for example, lower than 5% in CO2 Emis-
sions. As the attack group increases and thus more bogus data
are running the system, the unprotected ErouVe mechanism is
further deceived, e.g. more than 25% increase in travel duration
for five vehicles per attack group. It is worth noting that one
attacker per 10 seconds depicts 8.6% of 150 vehicles, while
for a group of five vehicles, the bogus community rises up to
30%. Although this observation indicates a strong point for
ErouVe, i.e. it takes a large number of vehicles to drop its
performance about 25%, it also highlights the necessity for a
defense mechanism capable of spotting spurious data to “cure”
the system.
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Fig. 6. As the number of FD attacks running in system increases, ErouVe’s
performance drops. About 30% of vehicles out of the total simulation were
bogus (attack group size set to 5) for a 25% decrement in travel duration.
C. Impact of Attack Interval
In Figure 7, we investigate the frequency of the attacks
with the attack group size set to three vehicles. As illustrated,
more frequent attacks have greater impact on the performance
of ErouVe, e.g. about 24% in travel duration when attacks
happen every six seconds, whereas there is 15% performance
drop when the interval is 14 seconds. Note that for the interval
of 14 seconds, only two attack groups “fit” in TIN, which
explains the lower impact in the protocol’s performance. As
the simulation time flows, the impact of earlier bogus data
expires and consequently if no significant amounts of new such
data are received in a short time, the system is very likely to
recover to near normal routing decisions.
D. Impact of Defense System VS FD attacks
In this last subsection, we present the performance of the
proposed defense system against FD attacks. Recall that our
goal is to have a performance similar to that of a scenario
where no bogus data are running through the system and
thus, prove the robustness of our defense mechanism. Figure 8
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Fig. 7. In order to significantly affect the routing decisions of ErouVe, bogus
data need to arrive in a timely manner, so as to continuously have bogus
data in the system. Otherwise ErouVe may quickly recover to original routing
instructions.
illustrates the obtained results and it is evident that the pro-
posed method remarkably closely follows the performance of
the original ErouVe algorithm. This is due to the fact that
tweaked data are successfully omitted from the system and
hence, ErouVe’s routing instructions are only guided through
real information. The proportion of vehicles sent to the longer
route is 26.5% for the defended ErouVe and about 19% for
those that are vulnerable.
The deviation observed between the defended and original
algorithm can be explained by the following reasons: first,
since tweaked data come in groups, i.e. three consecutive ve-
hicles, when labeled bogus and thus omitted from the system,
ErouVe is left with no new received reports for an interval
between the last received bogus data and the most recent true
report. Second, a similar delay is induced in the protocol when
data appears to be bogus, but it really is not, representing a
traffic shift, between the time the report is labeled as BPS and
later integrated in VoW. Such considerations induce a delay in
the routing decisions and consequently, a deviation from the
original ErouVe, but nevertheless are essential in order to filter
out malicious vehicles.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper we investigated how an eco-routing mech-
anism that is based on DSRC communications, is affected
from faulty information that is disseminated from malicious
nodes in a vehicular environment. We implemented and tested
the eco-routing mechanism under attack scenarios that try to
favor or discourage cars from following a route and we ob-
served that a typical eco routing mechanism in an unprotected
mode is strongly influenced by those attacks. Based on these
observations, we implemented novel defense mechanisms that
exploit vehicular communications in order to make the network
robust to several attacks. The defense mechanisms managed to
alleviate the effect of the attacks and restore the performance
of the eco routing mechanism to near its optimal operation.
In the future, different attack scenarios are going to be in-
vestigated and more complex defense mechanisms developed.
The presented work can be a basis for the development of an
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Fig. 8. The proposed defense system returns the protocol to near identical
routing decisions by successfully filtering out the outliers and thus the overall
system’s performance is preserved.
integrated defense system for vehicular networks that can cope
with complex attack scenarios.
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